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Collective Bargaining in the 
University Faculties 
Pros and Cons 
David M. Beatty 
In this paper, the author concludes that the collective 
bargaining model will be able to préserve the most vital 
features of the intellectual community. 
It is my feeling that it would be presumptious of anyone to advise 
others of what they conceive to be the pros and cons of university fa-
culties entering into a régime of collective bargaining. Ultimately such 
characterizations must remain matters of subjective judgment which will 
vary with each of our own personal philosophies, expériences and most 
especially with the vantage points from which we will moniter this emerg-
ing phenomenon on university campuses. 
I do not perceive collective bargaining in the abstract as itself being 
the primary causal force which will wrench major and fundamental 
changes in the university's life-style. More specifically, I am of the view 
that collective bargaining should not be perceived as a radical force 
intent upon challenging or undermining the historical purposes pursued 
or the basic principles subscribed to by the university community. To 
the contrary collective bargaining must be recognized as simply one 
model on which the décision making process may be patterned and as 
such its major, if not sole impact on any organization, industrial or acadé-
mie, will be with respect to the existing structures and institutional rela-
tionships of that organization. Although of necessity the replacement 
of a collégial process, through which 
most universities presently détermi-
ne and sélect their most immédiate 
objectives, by a System of collective 
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bargaining, may affect the priorities attached to any one of those ob-
jectives, nevertheless there is nothing inhérent in the collective bar-
gaining model which would suggest such a reorganization will generate 
fundamentally or radically différent idéologies and objectives for the 
universities. To the contrary, expérience would suggest that collective 
bargaining in North America is essentially a conservative force, one 
which reacts to rather than initiâtes fundamental change in the institu-
tional and organizational structures of which it becomes a part. Although 
it is true that collective bargaining has I believe added immesurably to 
the financial and économie security of the worker in North America, it 
is also manifest that it has never professed to be intent upon altering the 
basic économie or philosophical underpinnings of our quasi market 
economy. Similarly then in the university community, while collective 
bargaining will affect the methods by which and the structures through 
which universities résolve and fulfill their aims and ambitions, expér-
ience would suggest that it will generally accept and subscribe to the 
basic premises and purposes of those universities of which it will become 
a part. Indeed, as I shall elaborate below, it is the académies' perception 
of collective bargaining as a process or framework through which those 
precepts and ideals which they conceive to be basic and intégral to the 
university concept can be vigourously defended and pursued, which in 
large part explains their présent interest in and filtration with this dé-
cision making model. Succinctly, collective bargaining as simply one 
available structure for décision making stands neutral on and is com-
patible with the generally accepted ambitions and objectives pursued by 
university faculties. 
To apply this gênerai premise more particularly to the development 
of colleetve bargaining on the university campus, I believe that there are 
strong external forces acting upon the university community which hâve 
had and will continue to hâve far more impact than collective bar-
gaining in the delineation of the basic purposes and priorities which ought 
to be pursued by that community. Indeed to a large extent I view the 
présent interest in collective bargaining primarily to be a reaction to 
the impact faculties assume such external forces hâve had or are likely 
to hâve on the fundamental premises which faculties generally assert 
lie at the heart of the university's existence. More particularly I believe 
that the trends we are presently experiencing, for example, (1) the 
sharp curtailment of governmental financial support to the educational 
community in gênerai, (2) the concomitant increase in governmental 
scrutiny of and participation in the life of the university, (3) the forces 
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of egalitarianism that are manifesting themselves throughout our society, 
and (4) the demands of other interest groups such as students and sup-
port staff to participate in the governing structures of the university, 
rather than collective bargaining, hâve been and will continue to be 
the root causes of the fundamental reordering of university life that we 
are presently witnessing across the country. In short faculty interest in 
collective bargaining should be perceived as a response to, rather than 
an initiator of thèse basic altérations in the structure, rôle and life of 
the university. It would be inaccurate and I believe unfortunate to per-
ceive collective bargaining as the root cause or even a major force in 
the reordering of the goals and objectives of the university community. 
Collective bargaining has not been traditionally, nor is it likely to be-
come on university campuses, a mechanism by which existing institu-
tional assumptions are radically reordered. Rather collective bargaining 
is properly viewed as a tool, a technique, or one of the available means 
by which one or more of the constituencies living within the university 
structure can respond to thèse forces of change. Needless to say then, 
one would expect to witness the development of collective bargaining 
models rather more quickly on those campuses where the forces I hâve 
described hâve matured more completely and impinged more immediately 
to the perceived disadvantage of the faculties located at those campuses. 
Thus, where faculty control of university life has been relatively un-
affected by such forces and accordingly where the faculty's perception 
of the basic ideals and fundamental priorities of the university institution 
remains paramount and uncompromised, it is unlikely collective bar-
gaining would be considered a préférable alternative to the collégial con-
trol presently exercised by those faculties. Where however thèse social 
and political forces hâve seriously eroded or altered the traditional pre-
minence of the faculty in the articulation, promulgation and adminis-
tration of university policy, collective bargaining is likely to be viewed 
as a viable means by which some or ail of the traditional faculty pré-
rogatives and objectives for the university can be preserved. 
Having attempted to place the significance or impact of collective 
bargaining in what I believe is its proper perspective, I should acknow-
ledge that in forecasting the conséquences which are likely to ensue from 
faculties embracing a régime of collective bargaining, I will not attempt 
to predict its probable effect on faculty rémunération, job security, work-
ing conditions and other substantive issues. In the first place, that ultim-
ately will be a function of the market forces and bargaining power of 
the respective faculty associations and universities which prevail at the 
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relevant negotiation times. More critically however if one recognizes 
that collective bargaining is merely a process or framework through 
which virtually any set of ideals or interests may be pursued, it necessarily 
follows that in the abstract, the model itself stands neutral not only on 
what priorities and objectives will be advanced by any one constituency 
but necessarily on which of those ideals and priorities will prevail in the 
process. Collective barganing simply does not project any preconceived 
solutions on such substantive issues as lay offs, non renewal of term con-
tracts, research assistance and responsibilities nor indeed on any other 
such issue of topical concern to the faculty. Collective bargaining merely 
provides the process through which those goals and ideals which the 
faculty conceives as essential to a vibrant university concept, will be 
articulated and may be attained. 
It is of paramount importance that collective bargaining be viewed 
as simply one model of the decison making process and not confused 
with any set of assumed priorities which may be advanced in the process 
or with any set of predetermined solutions which might be generated by 
the process. Endless debate on the proper posture a faculty should, or 
is likely to adopt during collective bargaining with respect to such issues 
as lay off, non renewal of term contracts, teaching and research res-
ponsibilities is more properly a matter of détermination by ail of the 
faculty members in the union and will necessarily vary in each académie 
institution. Whether a given faculty union will in the first instance demand 
detailed rules and provisions with respect to lay offs or teaching res-
ponsibilities and whether ultimately such demands will prevail will ob-
viously vary with the circumstances prevailing at each institution and 
in ail events on the wishes of a majority of each faculty. To draw such 
issues into an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of collective bar-
gaining as an appropriate model of décision making for universities would 
be to enter the realm of purest spéculation and unfounded hypothesis. 
Moreover, and more critically, such a discussion would only serve to 
confuse and obfuscate the essential characteristic of collective bargaining 
as a décision making process and lend credence to the common mis-
assumption that this model will of necessity generate and indeed is 
synonymous with a given set of substantive solutions. 
As a gênerai principle then any analysis as to the applicability and 
appropriateness of the collective bargaining model to the university com-
munity must be limited to an examination of the procédural, structural 
and institutional changes that will be occasioned by that model. However, 
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and although the greater part of this analysis will be restricted to deli-
neating such conséquences, if one subscribed to the generally accepted 
view that collective bargaining, by stipulating that the employer must 
meet and bargain with its employées, (which most commonly will resuit 
in a legally binding contract between the parties), has in fact resulted 
in some économie gains and a very dramatic improvement in job security 
for those employées in both the public and private sectors who hâve 
opted for collective bargaining, then one may be reasonably confident in 
forecasting similar results in the university community. In short I take it 
as a given that collective bargaining should resuit in some real improve-
ment in the financial and more critically in the job security of faculties 
generally and most especially for the younger and more junior members 
of those faculties. Thèse then I assume may be taken as two accepted 
« pros » which in ail probability will flow to those faculties who opt for 
collective bargaining. 
To suggest what other faculty objectives can or are likely to be sec-
ured in collective bargaining would be as I hâve indicated, to engage in 
idle spéculation and is neither an appropriate nor a relevant inquiry in an 
analysis of the propriety of collective bargaining for the university com-
munity. Rather I will attempt to identify what I conceive as three more 
far reaching, though perhaps less dramatic, structural conséquences that 
faculties who engage in collective bargaining are likely to confront. Before 
I briefly discuss each of thèse however I must digress to unequivocally and 
categorically reject one négative scénario, commonly suggested, that 
collective bargaining by university faculties will necessarily lead to en-
forced mediocrity or a herd effect in which the lowest common denom-
inator must inevitably prevail. Such an assumption exhibits to my mind 
a myopie view of collective bargaining. In the first place it incorrectly 
assumes that this process of décision making is ideologically committed 
to and virtually synonymous with a certain set of objectives and prior-
ities. To repeat, collective bargaining as simply one model of the décision 
making process stands neutral and silent upon the déterminations that 
will be generated by it. Further such an assumption focuses exclusively 
on a single model of collective bargaining that prevails in most, but by 
no means ail, of the private, blue collar sector (which is admittedly the 
most pervasive) where precisely because there are at best only marginal 
différences in the skill and job functions required to be performed, unions 
hâve historically sought, and to a significant degree succeeded in elimin-
ating differentials in wages and working conditions which to their mem-
bers had been promised on personal acquaintances, préférences, favour-
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itism, and other invidious subjective distinctions. To assume however 
that collective bargaining is only capable of pursuing that single objective 
simply ignores the adaptability and flexibility of this model to respond 
and conform to significantly différent employment markets where sub-
stantial and objective différences in skill and ability are manifest and 
indeed are encouraged. Indeed it is quite improper to assume the exist-
ence of a single model of collective bargaining when in fact an infinité 
variety of models hâve been constructed to meet the peculiarities of the 
various sectors of the economy. For example the assumption of enforced 
mediocrity simply dénies the existence of those collective bargaining 
models that are firmly entrenched in the entertainment industry, the 
athletic professions, in journalism and indeed in those universities such 
as C.U.N.Y. where faculties presently bargain collectively with their ad-
ministrators. In those sectors the significant différences in the wages and 
working conditions enjoyed by a Marlon Brando, a Joe Namath, a Pierre 
Berton manifestly réfute the assertion that in the University community 
a Claude Bissell, a Buzz Woods or a Fred Carrothers is likely to suffer 
the same rémunération, teaching load, office amenities, or research 
assistance that is presently enjoyed by their junior colleagues. In short it 
is simply inaccurate to assume, as some commentators hâve, that col-
lective bargaining is necessarily inconsistent with and must ultimately 
deny gradations in working conditions, rémunération, job security, etc. 
which can be premised upon objective différences in skill? ability and 
qualifications. 
Such an assumption inaccurately attributes to collective bargaining 
an ideology of egalitarianism which while admittedly may be embraced 
as part of it, must not be construed as synonymous with it. It is true that 
there are strong currents and pressures in society calling for a more 
egalitarian and co-operative community the results of which are already 
manifesting themselves on the university campus. It must also be con-
ceded that such pressures may ultimately undermine or indeed deny the 
existence of a meritocracy in university life in particular or the larger 
community in gênerai. Nevertheless from what has been said above, it 
must be recognized that collective bargaining need not join cause in the 
university environment with such external forces. That is a matter for 
the faculty itself and not the process of collective bargaining to déter-
mine. Moreover, I would suggest that to the contrary, collective bar 
gaining ultimately being an adversary and not a co-operative model, and 
recognizing that real and significant différences in skills, abilities and 
market power between individual faculty members as well as between 
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departments and disciplines can be objectively delineated, the intro-
duction of collective bargaining to university campuses will act as a 
counterforce to the egalitarian undercurrents I hâve described above. 
Indeed as I shall elaborate below, (where for the last time I shall spec-
ulate as to a substantive solution this or any other process is likely to 
generate), it would be my view that not only is collective bargaining 
consistent with the application of the merit principle to détermine the 
future of both individual faculty members as well as departments and 
faculties, but to the extent the collectivity of faculty fails to perceive and 
respond to the heterogeneity existing between individual faculty members 
and departments and disciplines, the viability and efficacy of collective 
bargaining as an appropriate décision making mechanism for the uni-
versities will be largely forfeited. In fact, not only is a meritocracy 
consistent with and essential to a régime of collective bargaining on 
university campuses from the faculty's perspective, but I suspect that, 
as reflected in the various pièces of législation governing public servants 
across the country, university administrators, like their counterparts in 
the public service, will join cause with faculties to ensure that this prin-
ciple remains paramount and pre-eminent in the years to corne. 
Having described the context in which collective bargaining on uni-
versity campuses is evolving and against which it must be measured, and 
having delineated what I conceive to be the most germane characteristics 
of the model for university faculties, let me now identify three fundamental 
conséquences which I believe will confront those university faculties 
who turn to collective bargaining to respond to the social forces of which 
I spoke earlier. 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE FACULTY TO THE ADMINISTRATION 
In the first place and most fundamentally I would think it inévitable 
that if collective bargaining does take root in university faculties, it will 
precipitate the current érosion and ultimate démise that we are presently 
witnessing in the collégial System of university self government. Very 
simply to the extent faculties détermine to engage in collective bargaining 
to forestall this perceived érosion in their influence, they must necessarily 
formally withdraw from the day to day responsibilities of university man-
agement and administration. To put the matter succinctly, faculties will 
not be allowed to bargain with themselves. That is to say, it is logically 
inconsistent (if not legally impossible) that government would counte-
nance a union dominated management. Rather, to opt for collective bar-
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gaining necessarily implies the faculties' input in the décision making 
process must be by means of their participation in an adversary bar-
gaining relationship with the university administrators or more likely 
in the final instance, with the relevant government authorities. To pro-
perly comprehend this transition from collégial décision making to ad-
versary bargaining several points should be made. In the first place to 
the extent that faculties who are seriously considering the collective bar-
gaining option hâve already experienced a serions érosion of their influence 
and ideals in the collégial System as a conséquence : of the more direct 
and fréquent governmental intrusion into university affairs ; of the 
sharp decrease in the level of financial support being allocated to ail ed-
ucational institutions ; and of the enforced sharing of the décision making 
process with other constituencies within the university community ; col-
lective bargaining again must be seen as simply recognizing and res-
ponding to a given set of social conditions which themselves are the ma-
jor cause in that érosion of the faculty influence and ideology. As I 
hâve indicated rather than initiating a reordering of the university's 
priorities and objectives, collective bargaining should properly be rec-
ognized as simply one means by which faculties may respond to the 
reordering which is already taking place. 
Secondly I believe that the faculty in opting out of the direct govern-
ing of university life, both university administrators and the faculty will ul-
timately be seen to be net beneficiaries. I would reach this conclusion be-
cause it would be my expectation that faculties who opt for collective bar-
gaining will for the first time provide a meaningful check upon and act as 
a continuons monitor of university administrators which should inevitably 
resuit in improved and more responsive managerial personnel. Con-
versely by consciously forcing a récognition and acceptance of the 
essence of their relationship to the university as one of employment, col-
lective bargaining will explode what Professor Myron Lieberman has 
referred to as « the pathetic confusions about professionalism [which] 
hâve misled faculty members into believing that professors at each insti-
tution are entitled to make management décisions. . . » It is this failure 
to recognize and corne to terms with what essentially is a split or dual 
personality which has created innumerable conflicts of interest for faculty 
members torn between their concern for the university in gênerai and 
their colleagues in particular. In short, such a dramatic withdrawal by 
faculties from the management function will serve to clearly delineate the 
proper rôles and responsibilities of both faculty and administrator. It 
will remove the présent schizophrenia, under which so many faculties 
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have unwittingly laboured, and which has been so clearly recognized by 
students and other estâtes who have perceived the governing structures, 
regardless of the bona fide of its participants, at worst as heavily biased 
against them and who at best viewed such faculty managers as incapable 
of exercising a completely objective and rational judgment on university 
issues where their faculty and administrator hats might lead them to op-
posite conclusions. 
A third point that must be made with respect to the conscious 
relinquishing of the operational responsibility which is implicit in a col-
lective bargaining model is that it does not necessarily follow that such 
issues as hiring, promotion, tenure, curriculum, admission requirements, 
teaching methods and loads, research responsibilities, etc., and other 
traditionally « académie » issues need necessarily be turned over to or 
indeed even bargained about with university administrators. Again there 
is ample précèdent in several collective bargaining models e.g. the musi-
cians unions, the newspaper guild and perhaps more ominously the skilled 
construction trades where such « internai market issues », which other-
wise might be considered traditional management prérogatives, are in 
fact made the ultimate responsibility of the trade union and its members. 
Whether or not governments as the ultimate employer, or university ad-
ministrators as their surrogates, intrude into areas traditionally considered 
the académies' exclusive préserve dépends upon political and économie 
considérations which are quite independent of whether or not a university 
faculty opts for collective bargaining. It is true that to the extent col-
lective bargaining were, as it has been in the private sector, instrumental 
in protecting the legitimate économie and social interests of the faculty, 
governments or their administrators might well be more inclined to 
attempt to examine more closely at the bargaining table such « académie » 
issues, traditionally considered to be within the faculty's exclusive juris-
diction, as hiring, promotion, tenure, curriculum, teaching methods and 
loads, sabbaticals, etc. as a means by which other « économie » gains 
secured by the faculty through collective bargaining could be offset. To 
accept the possibility of more active government interest with respect 
to thèse « académie » issues if collective bargaining did in fact secure 
such additional « économie » benefits as improved rémunération, job 
security, and working conditions, is however to expressly acknowledge 
that governments' historié déferrai to the faculty on matters « académie » 
has implicitly been paid for by faculties in the form of poor working 
conditions, and lower wage and benefit packages. To put the matter 
somewhat differently, insofar as government or any employer is con-
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cerned and regardless of the model of décision making under which the 
employer is constrained to operate, the distinction between « académie » 
and « économie » issues is an illusory and meaningless one. Every issue, 
including class size, teaching methods and loads, curriculum, sabbaticals 
and research responsibilities has a price tag or an économie component 
to it. Indeed to ignore the duality of ail of thèse issues is to deny the 
expérience of the secondary school teachers in Ontario whose success 
in protecting the académie integrity of their staff-student ratios was paid 
for directly in the form of smaller wage settlements. Conversely then to 
the extent faculties are able to secure larger wage and fringe benefit 
packages, additional protection of job security, etc. through collective 
bargaining or otherwise, it necessarily follows government will endeavour 
to offset such gains by more closely scrutinizing the costs attributable to 
and the inefficiencies inhérent in the curriculum, teaching and research, 
tenure and promotion and sabbatical aspects of university life. It is 
essential however that one not attribute such heightened governmental 
concern with issues of primary importance to the académie to the advent 
of collective bargaining on the university campus. Such detailed scrutiny 
by the legislators will follow, regardless of the methods by which facul-
ties participate in the governance of the university, whenever legislators 
conceive the allocation of public monies to the university community 
to be beyond their means and this regardless whether such faculty gains 
at the bargaining table are the root cause of this perceived misallocation. 
Ultimately the ability of faculties to resist and forestall governmen-
tal intrusion on any of thèse fronts, « académie » or « économie », will 
primarily be a function of their bargaining power. If, as is generally ack-
nowledged, collective bargaining is seen to enhance the bargaining power 
of the individual constituents in any community, university faculties' 
interest in and movement towards collective bargaining is readily explic-
able and conforms to my earlier characterization of it as primarily a 
reactive force. Further if the expérience in the private sector is applicable 
to the university community, collective bargaining by augmenting the 
collective power of the university's faculty will, as noted earlier, resuit 
in their being better able to ensure that faculty idéologies and objectives 
as to the fundamental rôle and responsibility of their university are more 
likely to be recognized and given effect to by administrators and govern-
ments alike. Indeed, if the expérience in the private sector holds true, 
the gains secured by those faculties who hâve opted for collective bar-
gaining will in ail probability be made at the expense of those other areas 
of the public sector, including other university campuses, which, by re-
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maining unorganized, hâve to some degree prejudiced their relative bar-
gaining power. 
In any event, as I hâve suggested, bargaining power aside, there is 
simply nothing inconsistent with any theory of collective bargaining for 
faculties to retain or seek to retain jurisdiction over issues primarily of 
an académie nature. What is true and what would be inconsistent for a 
faculty which sought to bargain collectively with its administration would 
be for them to attempt to participate in the initial formulation and ad-
ministration of basic university policy other than through the negotiation 
and bargaining process. In sum then, apart from enhancing the bar-
gaining strength of the individual faculty member, the major conséquence 
of a faculty pursuing its interests and participating in the affairs of the 
university through a model of collective bargaining, would be a structural 
or mechanical one. Faculty members who were to be included in the 
faculty union or association would be required to withdraw from the 
policy making organs of the university which in the first instance are 
charged with the responsibility of formulating policy on issues over which 
the university administration retained control. As noted above, collective 
bargaining clearly perceives the illogical and potentially inéquitable con-
séquences of allowing one group to bargain with itself. It is this concern 
which has generated much debate in légal circles and at Labour Boards 
as to whether or not Deans, Directors and Chairmen should fall within 
or be excluded from the bargaining unit and faculty organization. To the 
extent such persons do détermine and formulate basic policy on issues 
over which the administration has retained control, in their departments 
and faculties, it would necessarily follow from what has been said about 
the nature of the collective bargaining model, that they would be required 
to withdraw from the faculty for the period that they occupied such 
positions. More specifically, and by way of illustration, any one who was 
to remain within the faculty unit would no longer be allowed to participate 
in the budget formulation process. The faculty union's input in this pro-
cess would be to respond to rather than formulate basic financial déci-
sions. In essence it would be the faculty's function to serve as a scrutineer 
of those other constituencies who in the first instance drafted the budget 
proposais. Where those proposais allocated a sum or percentage about 
which the faculty felt aggrieved, that would delineate the areas of bar-
gaining between them and the budget making authorities. 
As I hâve said, such a restructuring of the décision making process 
from collégial self government to adversary bargain can I believe ensure 
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to the benefit of faculty and administration alike. By providing a mean-
ingful check on or review of the proposed allocation of university re-
sources, the administration would be required to justify its priorities, its 
anticipated expenditures and its inability or unwillingness to meet faculty 
concerns and priorities in a detailed fashion that they are not piresently 
called upon to do. It will require administrators to justify on objective 
criteria the policies and objectives they intend to pursue rather than, as 
at présent, to explain away unpopular décisions on the idiosyncracies of 
collégial self government. In short it will deny administrators the pos-
sibility of using faculty or other participants in the self governing insti-
tutions as scapegoats for irresponsible or faculty décisions. Again, if the 
private sector expérience prevails in the university community the col-
lective bargaining model, by requiring the administration to justify its 
basic budgetary and policy décisions, will likely generate a group of 
more sophisticated skilled and efficient administrators. Faced with the 
bargaining power of a strong faculty union, university administrators, 
like their counterparts in the private sector will be required to more 
diligently explore methods by which the university function can be more 
efficiently exploit éd. Conversely faculties by shedding one half of their 
split personality, by recognizing that the essence of their status is that 
of a professional employée who increasingly has little input in the key 
décisions which are critical to his or her professional development, would 
be able to rigorously pursue their legitimate concerns and objectives. In 
a System of collégial décision making individual faculty-governors are 
daily subjected to political pressures inducing them to respond to and 
take account of the competing and often conflicting claims and idéologies 
of other estâtes in the university community often by compromising 
what for a majority of that faculty is a vital and intégral concept or 
principle of an académie institution. By way of contrast, in the process 
of collective bargaining the majority of the faculty would be able to 
ensure their spokesmen and figureheads vigorously and faithfully de-
fended such claims and objectives. In such a System it would be the 
task of the administrator, rather than selected persons from an interested 
constituency who would be called upon, in the first instance, to choose 
between ail or portions of such competing views and to then défend the 
policies and objectives they hâve adopted. In short, in such a posture 
faculties would be liberated from their présent participation in the col-
légial, self governing process where, responding to and sensitive of their 
conflicting rôles of faculty and administrator they wittingly or uncon-
sciously hâve been constrained to compromise their legitimate self inter-
ests. 
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THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE FACULTY TO OTHER ESTATES 
WITHIN THE UNIVERSITY 
Given the existing économie constraints under which universities 
are required to operate, it is manifest that faculties, staff, students and 
administrators will not ail be able to realize ail of their objectives nor 
ensure the university ultimately conforms to the ideological model each 
assumes proper. To take but one illustration, if university administrators 
were to accède to student and/or governmental interest in and demand 
for a more active and effective faculty commitment to its teaching function, 
necessarily a faculty's concern for more research assistance, in the form 
of both time and money, would be inhibited. Conversely to the extent 
that a faculty bargaining collectively is able to secure additional benefits 
and safeguard its vested interests more adequately than it can through 
a collégial, co-operative process it necessarily follows that in an era of 
diminishing financial support, other segments of the university com-
munity must invariably expérience some érosion of their respective 
interests. More specifically to the extent a faculty were able to success-
fully bargain collectively for higher wages, better sabbaticals, less teach-
ing responsibilities, universities and governments would necessarily hâve 
fewer resources available to meet the demands for better student amenities, 
lower tuition fées, and higher rémunération for its support staff. Succinctly 
then, collective bargaining would I think make explicit what hitherto has 
been the implicit conflict of interest between faculty and student, faculty 
and support staff, faculty and building development. In previous décades 
when growth was unrestricted and resources unlimited this conflict 
could be easily avoided. In an âge when the size of the pie is actually 
shrinking the luxury and myth of assuming a university to be a homo-
geneous community of scholars must necessarily be exploded. For the 
student the university has become a passport to a chosen career, for the 
support staff it is the very basis for their family's sustenance and physical 
well-being. For both groups the rationale for and objective of an académie 
institution will not conform in every détail with those assumed by the 
faculty. To the extent a faculty perceives a lower wage scale, poorer 
physical amenities etc., as an enforced subsidy of higher éducation and 
to the extent that collective bargaining is able to shift those costs to the 
direct users of the System (be they taxpayer and/or student), the implicit 
conflict between staff and student will be made manifest. Not surprismgly 
then on those campuses where faculties hâve opted for collective bar-
gaining and hâve been able to secure larger financial settlements, ad-
ditional research support, protections from mass-lay offs within départ-
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ments, protection from dismissal and déniai of tenure, student organi-
zations, (who hâve long since clearly discerned the force of collective 
action) hâve generally opposed faculty initiatives at the bargaining 
table. In short although not the root cause, I think it clear that collective 
bargaining will, by making explicit the inhérent tensions which divide 
the constituent estâtes within the university, precipitate the démise of 
the assumption that the university institution is made up of and created 
for a homogeneous community of scholars. Unless faculties presently 
hâve it within their power to préserve their critical interests and idé-
ologies, or unless they are prepared to actually subsidize such other 
estâtes and abandon their objectives, to the extent they seek to préserve 
their interests and aspirations through collective bargaining, they will 
find themselves inevitably competing at the bargaining table with those 
other estâtes. Although I personally believe this is the scénario which is 
likely to unfold, it is also true that the resulting tensions may possibly 
be muted to the extent that governments may respond to faculty successes 
at the bargaining table, at least in part, by allocating greater resources 
to the éducation budget rather than simply extracting the entire corn-
ponent of such faculty gains from the other sectors who lay claim to the 
university budget. Although I suspect that faculty gains made through 
collective bargaining would in fact resuit in some marginal increases to 
the universty budget, nevertheless I think it inévitable that some part 
of those gains would in fact remain to be borne by and extracted from 
the other actors on the university's stage. 
I should add that perhaps more than any other fact, it is this fear 
that a faculty, bargaining collectively, might well secure additional 
benefits, that has induced some groups such as professional librarians, 
whose aims and interests, unlike the student or staff groups, in some 
respects parallel the faculty's, to more frequently and plaintively make 
overtures for inclusion in the faculty organization. Recognizing that there 
are différences in training and purpose between themselves and the 
faculty, thèse professional librarians nevertheless clearly perceive that 
given their own limited bargaining strength, serious and adverse consé-
quences would likely resuit if they were required to compete with the 
faculty, student and support staff constituencies for récognition by the 
university administration of their own particular interests and claims. For 
such groups, what autonomy would be sacrificed in joining the faculty 
organization is generally felt to be more than offset by the additional 
strength and security that would be efforded by inclusion under the fac-
ulty's umbrella. 
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THE RELATIONSHIP WITHIN THE FACULTY ITSELF 
Perhaps the conséquence which will become most immediately 
apparent to a faculty which opts for collective bargaining and in a sensé 
the most significant cost of the gains which are likely to be secured 
through this régime, is to reveal to it the sharp divisions and tensions 
which exist within its own membership. It is hère where debate and 
democracy will hâve its full play that the limits and range of possible 
conclusions which will be generated by the collective bargaining process 
will be defined. Where salary increases should be channelled, criteria for 
tenure and promotion procédures to be employed, when lay offs and 
non renewal of term contracts are pending, whether the faculty union 
should press for a dental plan or improved pension benefits, whether 
professional librarians should be included in their association, ail will 
reveal sharp underlying splits between young and old, tenured and non 
tenured faculty, Departments and Faculties presently co-existing within 
the faculty constituency. Of thèse, and most critically I believe, collective 
bargaining will immediately delineate the tenuous relationship of the 
professional faculties to the rest of the faculty community. It has uniform-
ly been the expérience where faculties hâve considered the option of 
collective bargaining that unless meaningful salary differentials, con-
current vetoes on issues directly affecting them and other such guar-
antees are assured for such professional faculties as law, medicine, 
engineering and dentistry, thèse segments of the faculty community will 
either resist collective bargaining or alternatively will sever from the 
main faculty unit in order to préserve their real market power and their 
peculiar needs. In a sensé the professional faculties together with the 
« académie stars » form the essence of the faculty's true bargaining power. 
In both cases, the professional faculties and the acclaimed scholars 
possess real and attractive alternatives to a particular university and 
indeed to a university career. It is this market power which both possess 
and which the university administrators can ignore only at the péril of 
seriously depreciating the prestige and réputation of their university, 
which provides both groups in particular and the faculty in gênerai with 
their bargaining strength. Similarly it is the récognition of this fact that 
should induce faculty unions to make spécial provisions within their 
own constitutions for both the acclaimed scholars and professional schools. 
Although conscious of the fact that I am entering again the world of 
spéculation as to an actual détermination that is likely to follow from a 
faculty pursuing collective bargaining, I do so hère because of the 
prevalance of the view that collective bargaining must necessarily lead 
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to an institution committed to both uniformity and mediocrity. To the 
contrary however it is most probable, again if the analogy to the fédéral 
public service is appropriate, that as with the status of the established 
scholar, university administrators will be sympathetic to, in accord with, 
and indeed anxious that such differentiations in the faculty constituency 
be clearly defined. Failure to perceive that its bargaining strength lies 
in thèse two constituencies would I believe hâve disastrous conséquences 
for a faculty embarking on a course of collective bargaining. Failure to 
respond to the peculiar claims and interests of thèse two groups in the 
association's constitution would likely induce either or both to withdraw 
from it and seek to obtain such récognition directly from the university 
administration. Absent thèse two groups, the consequential effect on 
the bargaining capabilities of the residual unit would be potentially 
disastrous. Quite clearly without thèse two constituencies the bargaining 
strength of the remaining faculty would be enormously diluted if not 
completely eroded. 
Again, although not the root cause of the tension existing between 
diverse groups living within the faculty constituency, collective bargaining 
will I suspect bring such divisions rather dramatically to the fore. If 
university faculties fail to recognize and respond to their heterogeneous 
existence and in particular to the unique characteristics of their profes-
sional schools not only the faculties' strength but the very character of 
the university community itself will be fractured and divided to every-
one's loss. Seen in this light, collective bargaining may in fact be a 
positive force which by precipitating the confrontation of such basic issues 
requires the faculty to résolve thèse historié tensions within its own 
organization or face the rather stark alternative of fracturing and frag-
menting the faculty constituency into diverse and competing units. Faced 
with the prospect of an exodus of their colleagues and/or the balkan-
ization of their constituency, collective bargaining should induce faculty 
associations to respond to the acclaimed and unique positions of its 
established scholars and professional faculties. Collective bargaining by 
intemalizing the resolution of thèse existing tensions should allow for 
solutions to be fashioned in much the same spirit of compromise and 
accommodation that was achieved by those industrial unions which 
similarly were required to recognize and give effect to the legitimate 
concerns of its skilled trades minorities in their constitutional charters. 
To conclude and at the risk of labelling pro and con the conséquences 
I hâve described, let me note that there is nothing in what I perceive and 
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hâve described to be the likely conséquences which would follow from 
faculties opting for collective bargaining to catapult me into the depths 
of despair. Given the obviously pessimistic view that I take of the external 
forces that are likely to impinge on the university communities for some 
time to corne, I believe collective bargaining can be adapted to the insti-
tutional peculiarities of the university, can safeguard the legitimate con-
cerns of the faculties and will resuit in a healthy and serious examination 
of the rôles of each of the constituent bodies in the university com-
munity. Collective bargaining should induce entire faculties to confront 
and examine their basic needs, ambitions and idéologies with respect 
to the university. Failure to do so in the présent environment would be 
to default and to defer to the judgments of others as to the legitimacy of 
their claims and aspirations. Although I perceive that collective bar-
gaining is essentially an adversary relationship both with respect to the 
government, the administration, the students and the support staff, I 
do not believe that an adversary relationship must necessarily be one 
ridden with acrimony and conflict. To the contrary the very essence of 
collective bargaining is founded on negotiation, on reasoned compromise 
and above ail on a désire by ail participants to ensure the continued 
existence of a healthy and vibrant institution which is essential to ail 
of its constituencies. What collective bargaining may achieve is the 
assurance that administrators and governments will recognize and will 
ultimately respond to the real and legitimate interests of the faculty. 
Although the collective bargaining model necessarily assumes and indeed 
might be criticized for sanctioning and promoting a posture of self inter-
est on the part of each side, as I hâve indicated such self interest is 
constrained by the basic realization of the need for the continued exis-
tence of a vibrant and probing university. As I hâve indicated, there is 
nothing to suggest, and expérience would deny, that the adversary nature 
of the bargaining model necessarily implies acrimony and conflict. To 
the contrary, to the extent that collective bargaining is better able to 
resist the social and political forces presently impinging on the university 
communities and can assign the respective estâtes to their proper rôles, 
it may be, as I suggested at the outset, that the collective bargaining 
model will be able to préserve those features of the intellectual com-
munity most vital to us ail. 
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La négociation collective pour les professeurs 
d'université : le pour et le contre 
L'auteur ne croit pas que la négociation collective en soi puisse être une 
question capable d'entraîner des changements fondamentaux dans la vie univer-
sitaire, parce qu'il ne la considère pas comme une force radicale susceptible de 
modifier les principes traditionnels de la communauté universitaire. Au contraire, 
il faut tout simplement y voir un régime qui pourra transformer les processus 
décisionnels sans beaucoup exercer d'influence sur les objectifs que ces institutions 
poursuivent. On ne saurait non plus ignorer que, en Amérique du Nord, la 
négociation collective est essentiellement une force conservatrice en lutte contre 
les institutions en place beaucoup plus qu'une activité visant à les renverser. Ses 
objectifs sont d'assurer la sécurité économique et financière bien plus que de 
prôner des idéologies. Aussi, au niveau des professeurs d'université, elle affectera 
surtout les méthodes et non les fins. 
Au fond, il existe toujours des forces extérieures qui ont eu et continueront 
dans l'avenir à avoir plus d'impact sur l'orientation des universités que la négociation 
collective et il faut considérer le recours à ce moyen principalement en tant que 
réaction contre le poids des forces extérieures qui se manifestent par la réduction 
brusque des subsides des gouvernements, l'accroissement concomitant du contrôle 
de l'État et de sa participation à la vie universitaire, par le jeu des forces d'éga-
litarisme qui se développent au sein de la société et par les pressions d'autres 
groupes comme les étudiants et le personnel de soutien qui veulent se mêler de 
l'administration des affaires universitaires. Plus l'action conjointe de ces quatre 
facteurs sera marquée, plus les professeurs seront enclins à s'engager dans la 
négociation collective. C'est dans une telle perspective qu'il faut voir ce phénomène 
nouveau. 
D'autre part, selon l'auteur, il est difficile d'y aller de prédiction concernant 
l'influence de la négociation collective sur les traitements, la sécurité d'emploi et 
les conditions de travail des professeurs, parce que ceux-ci dépendront toujours, 
en dernier ressort, de la situation des marchés de l'emploi, de la puissance de 
marchandage des universités et des associations de professeurs. En soi, la négo-
ciation collective n'offre pas de solutions toutes faites aux mises à pied, au non-
renouvellement des contrats d'emploi et aux questions touchant la recherche et 
les responsabilités des professeurs. La façon dont seront abordés ces sujets variera 
sans doute d'une institution à l'autre et selon les desiderata des professeurs de 
chaque faculté. Tenter de procéder à une analyse des forces et des faiblesses de 
la négociation collective comme modèle décisionnel approprié pour les universités 
ne serait que spéculation et hypothèse, et ceci ne servirait qu'à embrouiller les 
caractéristiques même de la négociation collective en tant que processus de 
décision. 
L'auteur passe ensuite à l'examen des changements institutionnels qu'entraînera 
l'action collective des professeurs et il estime que, tout comme les choses se sont 
passées dans le secteur privé, il s'ensuivra une certaine amélioration des traitements 
et de la sécurité d'emploi des professeurs. Par ailleurs, il faut rejeter l'idée que 
la négociation collective chez les professeurs d'université conduira nécessairement 
à la médiocrité et qu'elle aura une espèce d'effet grégaire sur leur comportement 
de telle manière que la compétence sera ramenée au plus bas dénominateur commun. 
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Il existe en effet plusieurs modèles de conventions collectives pouvant s'adapter 
à des situations différentes selon les modalités des différents secteurs de l'activité 
économique. On peut en citer plusieurs exemples : artistes, athlètes, journalistes. 
Les différences de traitements et de conditions de travail entre un Marlon Brando, 
un Joe Namath et un Pierre Burton ne peuvent-elles pas s'appliquer à un Claude 
Bissel, un Buzz Woods ou à un Fred Carrothers au niveau universitaire ? Bref, 
il est inexact de soutenir que la négociation collective est incompatible avec 
l'établissement de traitements, de conditions de travail et d'une sécurité d'emploi 
fondés sur la compétence et les qualifications. Elle ne tend pas naturellement 
vers de pareilles formes d'égalitarisme, même s'il faut admettre qu'on trouve dans 
la société des courants en ce sens qui se manifestent aussi dans les universités. 
Il appartient aux professeurs eux-mêmes d'y voir de manière à leur faire obstacle. 
Toutefois, ce qui précède ne signifie pas que la négociation collective n'aura 
pas de conséquences sur la vie universitaire. On peut les grouper sous trois chefs 
principaux. 
D'abord les relations entre le corps professoral et l'administration. Il sera 
inévitable que si la négociation collective s'implante parmi les professeurs d'uni-
versité, elle accélérera l'érosion du système collégial d'autogouvernement des uni-
versités. 
Une fois engagés dans un régime de négociation collective, les corps profes-
soraux devront se départir des responsabilités administratives au niveau des facultés 
et il est certain que leur influence diminuera comme conséquence de l'intrusion 
des gouvernements dans les affaires universitaires. 
En second lieu, étant donné que, par suite de la négociation collective, les 
professeurs scruteront de plus près les actes de l'administration, celle-ci agira de 
façon à accroître la qualité de son bureau de direction du personnel. On peut 
croire qu'ainsi disparaîtront peu à peu certains dédoublements de personnalité. 
Le rôle et le pouvoir des professeurs se trouveront bien délimités, plus tranchés. 
Il ne faudrait pas penser non plus que des sujets tels que l'engagement, les 
promotions, les méthodes d'enseignement, les responsabilités en matière de recherche 
et, en général, tout ce qui relève de la pédagogie, va nécessairement échapper aux 
professeurs, parce que, dans nombre de négociations collectives déjà, chez les 
musiciens et chez les journalistes, par exemple, des questions de cet ordre restent 
en dernier ressort la responsabilité du syndicat et de ses membres. L'intervention 
des gouvernements et des administrateurs agissant comme leurs mandataires dans 
ces domaines dépend généralement de considérations politiques et économiques 
qui n'ont rien à voir avec la négociation collective. Ainsi, le fait que le gouverne-
ment s'en soit historiquement remis aux professeurs pour ces questions académi-
ques a implicitement été payé par eux sous forme de mauvaises conditions de tra-
vail et de masse salariale inférieure. 
Enfin, il faut aussi souligner que le pouvoir de marchandage est possiblement 
un puissant moyen de résistance à l'intrusion des gouvernements dans la vie 
universitaire. 
Si l'on considère la négociation collective sous l'aspect des rapports du corps 
professoral avec les autres groupes de la communauté universitaire, surtout dans 
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la mesure où les subventions gouvernementales se raréfient, on peut s'attendre à 
ce qu'il s'élève des conflits d'intérêts entre, d'une part, le collège des professeurs 
et, d'autre part, les étudiants, le personnel de soutien, voire le service de la cons-
truction et du développement. À l'université, les étudiants recherchent le passeport 
de leur carrière, le personnel de soutien, leur bien-être et celui de leur famille, ce 
qui n'est pas conforme aux objectifs vers lesquels tend le corps professoral. C'est 
pourquoi il est normal de s'attendre à des tensions internes, à moins que l'on 
ne réussisse à obtenir de plus grandes ressources de la part de l'État. 
Un dernier angle, enfin, sous lequel il faut considérer la négociation collective, 
c'est celui des rapports des professeurs entre eux, en particulier entre les facultés 
universitaires proprement dites et les écoles professionnelles : droit, médecine, 
génie, etc. . . . Les administrateurs devront tenir compte de ce facteur qui peut 
être de nature à mettre sérieusement en péril le prestige et la réputation de leur 
université. Il s'agira pour eux d'éviter toute attitude qui pourrait entraîner des 
scissions désastreuses. 
Comme conclusion de son travail, l'auteur estime que la négociation collective 
peut s'adapter au milieu universitaire et résulter en un examen sérieux et approfondi 
du rôle de chacun des groupes qui constituent la communauté pour peu que l'on 
comprenne que la négociation collective est fondée sur des compromis raisonnes 
et sur la volonté de tous les participants de vouloir maintenir le dynamisme de 
l'institution dont ils font partie en évitant l'acrimonie et les situations conflictuelles. 
Au contraire, la négociation collective, si elle rend la collectivité universitaire plus 
apte à résister aux forces sociales et politiques qui s'opposent actuellement à elle, 
contribuera à lui assurer plus de succès et de prestige. 
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